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In order to deliver an innovation principals employ competing agents in
some circumstances, while employing research team in other circumstances.
This paper compares various structures of R&D to provide a rational behind
this observation. It is assumed, that the principal can employ either one
agent, two competing agents or two agents, cooperating in a team. Which of
the available structures will be chosen by principal, depends on value of prize
in stake, technological benets of team production and team structure. Due
to the positive eect on incentives, competing agents always generate larger
prot to the principal, than a single agent. Further, they often perform
better than the team, even when the latter has signicant technological
benets. However, the performance of the team may be improved, if it
is organized as a hierarchy with the team leader (who is responsible for
allocation of resources) and his subordinate. The paper provides conditions
on parameters, which determine whether the principal should employ a team
or competing agents for performing R&D.
Keywords: moral hazard, hierarchy, team production, competition, organi-
zation of R&D
JEL Classication: O31, L23, C72
1 Introduction
There is a large body of literature which employs the principal-agent approach to
the analysis of nancing of innovation. This literature largely assumes a structure
For many valuable discussions and suggestions I am grateful to Avner Shaked, Eugen Kovac
and Patrick Schmitz.
ye-mail: ekaterina.goldfayn@uni-bonn.de.
1of a research unit to be exogenous and investigates the interaction of a principal
with either a single agent or multiple agents forming a team or competing with each
other. However, the decision of the principal on how many agents to employ and
how to structure their interaction is not explored suciently. Yet, such decision,
should be key for the principal, since it inevitably inuences both the technological
capabilities of the research unit and the incentives of the agents.
Anecdotal evidence suggest, that there are circumstances, when principals (i.e.
grant agencies, venture capitalists, government agencies) decide to employ com-
peting agents. For example, McKinsey, a consultancy, describes a case of a com-
pany in the chemical industry which was seeking ways to change the old chemical
production processes to more competitive synthesis routes. The company used
competing research teams to attack the problem.1 Similarly, Vulcan Inc., which
is a multi-division corporation, owned by former Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen,
has contracted three competing agencies for the project Halo, aimed at the devel-
opment of the problem-solving software.2 On the other hand it is not unusual for a
nancier to grant a nancial support to a consortium of co-operating independent
teams, rather than to each of these team separately. Numerous examples include
research grants by National Science Foundation of the US or by National Institute
of Health. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a theory, which ratio-
nalizes a decision of the principal to employ competing agents at some instances,
while to contract a non-competing team or a single agent at other instances.
A theoretical justication for why it can be protable for the principal to -
nance competing agents rather than a single agent is provided in Levitt (1995).
Che and Yoo (2001) analyze the attractiveness of the team production versus
stand-alone production in the repeated setting. Hemmer (1995) shows, that if
there are synergies from performing two tasks, then assigning a team to the sub-
sequent tasks results in higher product quality than assigning separate agents to
each of those tasks. Goldfain and Kovac (2005) compare benets from employ-
ing competing agents, rather than a single agent, in a dynamic framework with
multiple stages of R&D.
The present paper contributes to the literature on nancing of innovation by
investigating, when it is in principal's interests to assign competing agents to
the same task and when he prefers that agents cooperate in a team. The team
may have signicant technological benets (synergy eects). However, in the
presence of moral hazard the ability of team to exploit these synergies eciently
may depend on the team's structure. On the other hand, in the moral hazard
framework competition acts as an important incentive device and may prove to
be a superior organizational structure, comparing with team production, despite
1The case study is available at http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/chemicals
2The information about the project can be found at http://www.projecthalo.com
2the lower eciency of R&D and duplication of research costs.
To support this intuition, I analyze four alternative structures of R&D: stand-
alone agent, competing agents, team with equal partners and hierarchical team.
These structures are compared in a unied framework, where research is nanced
by a principal, but the agents have a discretion to decide whether to allocate
money into the project or to divert them for private consumption.
It is shown, that due to the positive eect which competition has on incentives,
the principal always prefers to employ competing agents, rather than a single
agent. The paper is therefore focused on comparing team production (where team
may be organized as a hierarchy or as equal partners team) with competing agents.
A team, where agents are treated identically by the principal, suers from the
free-riding problem, and therefore often performs worse, than competing agents. I
conclude, that such team will be employed, only if technological benets of team
production are high, or if a prize in stake is not too large.
The existing literature on team production suggests several mechanisms, which
allow to alleviate the free-riding problem in a one-shot model. The general idea
behind these mechanisms is, that agents are required to monitor each other and
submit the report to the principal, based on their observations (Miller 1997, Ma
1988, Marx and Squintani 2002 ). However, these mechanisms are dicult to im-
plement in the environment where agents feel guilty about spying on their team
mates. Therefore, I suggest an alternative mechanism, which under certain con-
ditions allows to increase the attractiveness of team production. Namely, the
principal may decrease the moral hazard in team by assigning one of the agents
to the principal position (position of the team leader) above the other agent (sub-
ordinate).
If the team leader can observe eort of an agent on the lower level of hierarchy,
then such hierarchical structure gives the team leader power to punish his subor-
dinate, if the latter shirks. This arrangement unambiguously improves incentives
of the subordinate, while also resulting in the ecient allocation of investment
recourses. Hence, the hierarchical team structure signicantly improves perfor-
mance of the team and increases range of parameters where the principal chooses
to employ agents, cooperating in a team.
On the other hand, if the team leader cannot observe and verify the eort of
his team mate, then the hierarchical team structure may improve incentives of
the former, although the incentives of the latter remain unaltered. I show that
in this situation there exists a range of parameters, where the team leader over-
invests in R&D, comparing with his best response reaction (i.e. comparing with
his investment choice in equal-partners team). For this range of parameters the
hierarchical team may become a superior arrangement comparing with alternative
team structure.
However, for the unobservable eort of the subordinate the hierarchical team
3always leads to suboptimal allocation of investments and to the loss of eciency
in terms of success probability. This eciency loss increases with investment
resources, allocated to the agents. Hence, for suciently large value of the prize
in stake (implying large value of investment resources) the principal will never
organize a research team as a hierarchy, if the team leader is not able to monitor
his subordinate.
Aside from the literature on nancing of innovation, this paper is related to
several other streams of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on team
incentives by analyzing alternative structures of team production and drawing
implications for the optimal contract and the investment decisions of the agents.
Second, by addressing benets and disadvantages of team production comparing
to the competitive setup, this paper is close in spirit to the literature on formation
of joint ventures.
In the literature on formation of joint ventures there are only few papers which
explicitly take a principal-agent approach. The most relevant among them is
Fabrizi and Lippert (2003). The authors investigate, how the presence of moral
hazard inuences decisions of two rms, each of which has one agent, to conduct a
joint project. The authors focus in their analysis on welfare eect of joint venture
and on the market strategies of the rms. Unlike their work, the present paper
studies inuence of dierent organizational structures on nancing decisions of the
principal, incentives of the agents and their investment decisions.
There is a stream of papers in the literature on team incentives, which similarly
to my paper investigate the internal structure of a team and its implementation for
productivity (Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo 1993, Itoh 1991, Itoh 1993). This
literature, however, has very dierent focus from the present paper: it is focused on
the analysis of the eects which mutual help, cooperation and reciprocity within
the team have on incentives. The existing literature on internal structure of a
team usually compares a group of individuals, where each is concentrated in his
own task with a team, where agents help each other. This is not the issue in the
present paper. Here the cooperation between the agents, in case when they form a
team, is simplied and boils down to the specialization in dierent tasks, which is
the source of synergy eects in the model. The paper contributes to the literature
by investigating a dierent aspect of team production, namely, whether and when
a team should be organized as a hierarchy.
The structure of this paper is the following. The basic framework of the model
is described in Section 2. The setup with a single agent, competing agents and
a team with equal partners is discussed through Sections 3 to 5. Section 6 is
devoted to the comparison of team setup with competing agents setup. In Section
7, I investigate the alternative team structure, where one of the agents has a
principal position over his peer, and draw the implications of such team structure
for the incentives of the agent an prot of the principal. Finally, the conclusions
4are summarized in Section 8. Proofs and gures can be found in Appendix.
2 Basic framework of the model
The basic structure of this model is following. There are two identical risk-neutral
agents (entrepreneurs), who have an idea how to solve a particular problem. The
problem (which I will henceforth call a project), if solved successfully, yields a
prize of size R. For example, if the project is to nd a cure against a deceases,
then R may represent a discounted stream of all future payo, generated by sales
of this cure. Moreover, I assume that in case of competition between agents, if
one of them successfully completes the project, the solution will be patented, so
that the follower does not earn anything.
It is assumed that the agents have no wealth and the necessary funds for
research and development are provided by a principal (venture capitalist, grant
agency or a rm which has subcontracted research and development to the agents)
in exchange for a share in the project. Although nances are provided by the
principal, allocation decisions are made by agents. They can either invest funds
or divert them for private uses. The principal is not able to observe the allocation
decision. All he can observe is a success or a failure of the project.
The principal is risk-neutral and maximizes his expected payo from the project.
I assume that the principal has all bargaining power, which means that after pay-
ing the agents their contractual payos, he retains all the residual surplus. The
principal oers agents a contract, which species the share of each agent in case
of success and the size of investment.3 Moreover, the principal can decide whether
to allow the agents to compete for the patent or to order them to form a research
team and to join their research eorts. In the former case the winning agent
patents his invention and shares the prize with principal. In the latter case, the
prize is shared between the team and the principal.
The success of the project is stochastic and depends on eorts of both agents
as well as on the structure of the research (team or competition). It is assumed,
that the eort of agents in this model is equivalent to their monetary investments
into R&D. For illustration, consider the case with one agent. Let the principal
transfer amount c to this agent. The agent allocated amount x  c to the research
and consumes c   x. I assume, that the probability of success is given by:
p(x) = 1   e
 x:
To justify this particular functional form, I make a realistic assumption, that the
project is successful only if the agent nishes his research before time T = 1
3It will become clear later, than in case of hierarchical team the principal oers a contract
only to the team leader.
5elapses4. I further assume, that the probability of success is p(x) = P(tx < 1),
where tx is an exponentially distributer random variable with mean 1
x. Note,
that from the relationship between the exponential and the Poisson distribution,
it follows, that x is an average number of successes in unit of time, while 1
x is
the expected time, until the rst success is made. It is clear therefore, that the
higher is investment x, the shorter is expected time, which elapses before a success
occurs.5 The interpretation of x as a parameter of exponential distribution is not
essential for the model. Another way to justify the functional form of p(x) is to
assume, that by investing x an agent generates a random variable tx, which is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0;ex]. This variable can be interpreted as
a distance covered between the initial stage of R&D and its nal stage. Assume,
that the project is successful, if the random variable takes the value tx  1. The
probability of this event is p(x) = 1   e x.
The research and development is modelled as a one-shot game. After the
contract is signed the agents make one-time decision on how much to invest and
the probability of success is a function of this investment.
3 Single agent
Let me rst consider the most simple case when only one agent is employed. The
game has two stages: in the rst stage the principal oers a contract, where he
determines amount of investment funds c and the share of the agent S. In the
second stage the agent (given the terms of a contract) allocates x  c into R&D
and consumes c   x. In case of success the agent receives a share S of R. I will
denote the prot of the agent S
1, where S stands for \single". Here I also use
the index of agent i = 1 to avoid confusion in further discussion, when the second








 x) + c   x: (1)
Note, that agent's prot consists of two parts. First, he enjoys a reward RS in
case of success (which happens with probability 1 e x). Second, he also consumes
part of funds at his discretion, so that c   x  0.6 The solution to the problem is
4The assumption of limited nancing horizon justied, since it is common for the venture
capital rms or grant agencies to set the time limits within which the research must be completed.
For theoretical justication see Goldfain and Kovac (2005).
5I also make a technical (normalization) assumption, that investment of x monetary units
translates to a probability 1   e x.
6To avoid confusion, note, that S denotes a percent share of the prize, while RS is a
monetary share.
6the following:
1. x = 0, if RS  1,
2. x 2 (0;c): is such that RS = ex, if 1  RS  ec,
3. x = c, if RS  ec.
The principal chooses the terms of the contract, namely amount of investment
c and the share of an agent S, taking into account the solution of Problem 1.
Note that if the principal chooses RS  1, the agent will consume all funds,
which leaves a principal with a negative prot S
P =  c. He can do better by
not investing in the project at all. Hence, if the principal decides to invest in
the project, he will never choose RS  1. So, we can limit our attention to the




P = R(1   S)(1   e x)   c
s:t: (ICS) RS  ex;
(RCS) x  c;
(CSS) (RS   ex)(x   c) = 0:
The incentive compatibility constraint (ICS) ensures, that the agent invests in
R&D. According to resource constraint (RCS) he can only invest as much as c.
Finally, according to complimentary slackness condition (CSS) at least one of the
two other constrains should be binding, as follows from the equilibrium conditions
above. If the incentive constraint does not bind, the agent invests all available
funds, so that RCS binds. If the recourse constraint does not bind, then the
incentive constraint will necessarily be binding.
Both the incentive compatibility constraint and the recourse constraint will
bind in the optimum. There is a following intuition behind this result. Assume,
that the (RCS) does not bind, so that x < c, where x is the equilibrium choice
of the agent. If the principal marginally decreases c, the agent's investment does
not change (the probability of success stays unaltered), but the investment cost
declines, so that the prot of the principal increases. Hence, in optimal solution
the principal always chooses c so, that the (RCS) binds. The same intuition
justies why the incentive compatibility constraint should be binding. Indeed,
assume that the constraint does not bind, so that RS > ex. Then the principal
can decrease a share of the agent (hence, increase his own share) without altering
the probability of success. So, in optimum the principal will choose such S, that
(ICS) constraint binds.
The explicit solution to the principal problem is derived in the proof to Propo-
sition 1, where I also formally prove, that both (ICS) and (RCS) constrains bind
in optimum.
7Proposition 1. Assume that the principal employs one agent and let R > 2.
Then in SPNE the following statements hold:
1. Values of c and S are such, that the agent invests all funds which he receives
from the principal, i.e. x = c.
2. The optimal amount of investment is c = ln 1
2( 1 +
p
1 + 4R), if R > 2 and
c = 0, if R  2
3. The reward of the agent is RS = ec.
Both the equilibrium amount of investment c and the reward of the agent RS
increase in the value of R. This is the essence of the tradeo which the principal
faces. He is willing to increase his investment, if the project promises a lucrative
payo. However, in order to ensure that the agent does not divert funds to the
private consumption, the principal has to balance the incentive constraint of the
latter by promising him a larger share of the prize.
Note further, that the c = 0 as R = 2. Since the equilibrium investment
expenditures of the principal increase in R, then for any R  2 the principal will
not employ a stand-alone agent in equilibrium.
4 Competing agents
In a setting with competing agents, the prize is shared between the winning agent
and the principal. After the terms of a contract (i.e., the share of each agent in
case of success and the amount of investments) are announced, the agents decide
which part of funds they allocate to R&D and which part they consume.
Let the principal transfer amount c to the rst agent and amount d to the
second agent. Let x  c be the funds which the rst agent allocates to the project
and c x  0 are the funds that he diverts to the private consumption. Likewise,
I dene y and d y. Second agent wins the prize, if he successfully completes the
project at time ty, such that ty  tx and ty  1, where tx is a time, when rst
agent completes his project. Hence, the probability that second agent succeeds is:




















Then, the expected payo of the second agent is C













+ d   y;
8where RC
2 is the share which the second agent receives according to a contract.
Analogically, the expected payo of the rst agent is:

C









+ c   x;
where RC
1 is the share which the rst agent receives according to a contract. Note,
that conditional on the fact, that at least one agent succeeds, the probability that
rst agent succeeds x
x+y and the probability that the second agent succeeds is
y
x+y.
This result is consistent with the nding of the literature on contests and patent
races (Tullock 1980, Dixit 1987, Loury 1979). Note further, that for y = 0, the
prot C
1 reduces to the prot of an agent in stand-alone situation.
In equilibrium, each agent plays his best response to the rival's strategy by
choosing amount of investment x or, respectively, y, taking RC
2 , RC
1 , c and d
as given. Let us consider the best response correspondence for the rst agent.

















Hence, the best response of the rst agent to the investment choice of the second
agent is




2. x 2 (0;c) such that RC
1 =
(x + y)2
(1   e (x+y))y + xe (x+y)(x + y)
, if
y





(1   e (c+y))y + ce (c+y)(c + y)
3. x = c, if RC
1 
(c + y)2
(1   e (c+y))y + ce (c+y)(c + y)
.
The best response of the second agent can be derived similarly. Depending on
the parameters, there are seven potential equilibria in the last stage of the game:
(0;0), (x;0), (0;y), (x;y), (c;y), (x;d), (c;d). The conditions for each of those
equilibria to occur, are described in Table 1 in Appendix.
The problem of the principal is to choose the terms of the contract so that the
residual expected payo (gross payo net of agents compensation) is maximized. I
rst derive the optimal contract for each possible equilibrium and then choose the
one, which delivers the principal the highest prot. If the equilibrium investment
decision is (x;y) = (0;0), then the optimal solution is not to employ the agents
and hence the prot of the principal is zero. The equilibrium decision such, that
9x 2 (0;c], y = 0 or x = 0, y 2 (0;d] is equivalent to at most one agent being
employed. Solution of the problem in this case is described in previous section.
Finally, if neither x nor y are zero in equilibrium, then the problem of principal
is to maximize his prot subject to incentive compatibility constraints, which are
described by equilibrium conditions (see Table 1). The principal receives his share
of the prize if at least one of the agents wins, which happens with probability
1   (1   p(x))(1   p(y)) = (1   e (x+y)). In equilibrium the principal is going to
treat the agents symmetrically, so that C
1 = C
2 and c = d. Further, the optimal
contract will be such, that the agents nd it just incentive compatible to allocate
all recourses which they receive to R&D. In other words, they will receive exactly
a share which makes them to invest x = y = c into the project. The problem
of the principal in the reduced form (i.e. with binding constrains and symmetric




P = R(1   C)(1   e 2x)   2c





The solution to this problem leads to the optimal contract and is formalized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let competing agents be employed. Assume that R > 2 and that
the agents are identical. Then for the optimal contract following statements hold:
1. The optimal choice of C
1 ;C
2 ;c;d leads to unique SPNE such that the agents
allocate all the funds into R&D: x = c, y = d.
2. In equilibrium the agents are treated symmetrically: C
1 = C
2 , c = d.
3. Equilibrium level of investment c increases in R and is given by
R =
e2c [4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c)]
(e2c + 2c   1)2
4. The rewards of the agents are given by RC
1 = RC
2 := RC =
4c
1   e 2c + 2ce 2c .
According to Proposition 2, if the principal employs competing agents, he will
suggest a contract which leads to unique SPNE with (x;y) = (c;c). From the
relationship between R and c it follows, that R ! 2 as c ! 0 (one can see this by
applying the L'Hospital rule twice). Hence, for R  2 the competing agents will
not be employed.
10The optimal contract for the competing agents is developed under the assump-
tion, that only the winner of the patent race receives a reward. It is easy to see
that any contract, where the follower also receives some reward, will be strictly
worse from the principal's point of view. Indeed, for each amount of investment
the optimal contract will be such, that agents invest all received funds in R&D.
Hence, the probability of success will be the same in a setting, where the follower
receives some reward, as in the setting where he receives nothing. However, in the
former case the incentives of the agents to invest are signicantly weaker, which
increases the rent they can extract from the principal. Hence, in more general
contract, where an agent earns a reward RL if he wins the patent race, and a
reward RF, if he looses this race7, the principal will optimally choose RF = 0.
The last step which is left to be done is to decide whether the principal indeed
prefers to employ competing agents instead of a single agent.
Corollary 1. Assume, R > 2. Then the principal always prefers to employ com-
peting agents, rather than a single agent.
The competition has a twofold eect in this model. It increases probability
of success and disciplines agents by decreasing the rent which they can extract
from the principal. These eects soften the principal's tradeo. Comparing to
the set-up with a single agent, he can aord increasing the investment level by
larger amount, while increasing the reward to the agents only by smaller share.
As is shown in the proof to the proposition above, in equilibrium the principal
will invest more if he employs competing agent, than if he employs a single agent.
However, the share, which he pays to each agent is smaller in the former case, then
in the latter. This result conforms to the intuition in Goldfain and Kovac (2005),
where the authors show (in dierent modelling framework) that competition is
always benecial for the principal, when the agents are identical.
5 Team production
An alternative organization of R&D, which the principal might use, is a research
team. In the team the agents join their eorts in order to complete the project. If
the project is successful, the prize is divided according to the contract between the
principal and the team. I assume, that the principal observes neither individual
nor the joint contribution of the agents to research. Hence, the agents receive their
reward only if the team succeeds. The problem inherited in the team production
is free-riding. If the team wins the prize, each agent receives his share, no matter
how much he has invested in the research. Hence, the agents face a tradeo
7\L" and \F" stay for the \Leader" and the \Follower" respectively.
11between increasing a joint probability of success by investing and increasing their
own payo by consuming the funds.
The team, however, may have technological benets compared to other or-
ganizational structures of the research unit. These technological benets from
cooperation (further referred to as synergy eects) allow the team to generate a
higher success probability for xed amount of investments, than each agent in
stand-alone situation can achieve. I model the team production by assuming that
the joint investments inuence the probability of success in the following way:




In the Appendix, I provide a formal model which justies the choice of the
function (x1 +y1 )
1
1  for modelling of the synergy eects in team production.
It is shown that this specication reects a situation, where probability of success
depends on two skills or production factors, and each of two agents is \talented"
in dierent skill (so, that it is relatively \cheap" for him). In this case the joint
production (i.e. the probability of success) is maximized, when each agent spe-
cializes in his cheapest factor.8 The parameter  2 [0;1), that is assumed to be
a common knowledge, characterizes a degree of complementarity between skills
of team members, which is the source of synergies in this model. If  = 0, then
there are no technological benets from employing a team. It succeeds with the
probability p = 1   e (x+y), which is the same as if a single agent invests (x + y).
Moreover, this probability exactly equals the probability that at least one of the
competing agents succeeds, as derived in Section 4.9 If  > 0, i.e. there are syn-
ergies in team production, then for the same amount of investment x and y the
team succeeds with higher probability, than a single agent, who invests the same
amount (or, for that matter, than at least one of two independent agents).
5.1 Optimal contract for team
This section is devoted to the solution of principal's problem in case when the
team is employed. I assume, that the principal signs two separate contracts with
both agents, in which he determines investment funds allocated to each agent and
a share of each agent in case of success. As before, the game is solved backwards
starting from the last stage, where the agents in team choose x and y, given the
terms of contract.
8Specialization is one of the sources of synergy eects. Another possible source is a better
organization of work, which allows to decrease the duplication of eort. See Lippert (2005) for
a model, relevant in this case.
9This is a result of a property of the exponential distribution: if probability of success as
function of investments is p (x) = 1 e x, then p (x+y) = 1 (1 p (x))(1 p (y)) = 1 e (x+y).
12I assume, that the agents choose their eorts simultaneously. Hence, each
member of the team maximizes his own prot, by playing the best response to the
investment decision of his team-mate, taking the terms of contract as given. The





1 (1   e (x1 +y1 a)
1





2 (1   e (x1 +y1 a)
1
1 a) + d   y:
Consider the problem of the rst agent. The rst derivative of the payo






















. Then, the best response of the rst agent
(i.e., optimal choice of x) to any y of the second agent is:
1. x = 0, if RT
1  1 and y = 0,








, if k  RT
1  1
3. x = c if RT
1  k.
Similarly, I can dene the best response for the second agent. As in the case of
competition, depending on values of RT
1 , RT
2 , c and d, dierent equilibria can
occur. The equilibrium conditions and resulting choice of (x;y) are summarized
in Table 2 in Appendix. As above, I will derive the optimal contract for each
possible equilibrium and then will choose the contract, which maximizes the payo
of the principal. If (x;y) = (0;0) is played in equilibrium, then the principal
prefers not to employ the team, which yields him a zero prot. Otherwise, the
principal maximizes his prot subject to incentive compatibility constraints, given
by equilibrium conditions, described in Table 2. There are two considerations to
be taken into account. First, the principal will give the agents exactly the amount
of money, which they are willing to invest (given their reward in case of success and
synergy eects). Hence, it must be the case, that x = c and y = d. The intuition
behind this result is analogical to the one, discussed in Section 3 and in proof to
the Proposition 1. Further, notice that for xed investment (c+d) the probability
of success is maximized, if the agents invest equal amounts to R&D. Hence, the
13principal will oer symmetric contracts to both agents, so that x = y = c = d (this
result is proved in the proposition below). Therefore, we can write the reduced




P = R(1   2T)(1   e 2
1
1  x)   2c (2)









The solution to the optimal choice model is formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The optimal contract for a team has the following features:
 If R > 1 + 2
1
1 , then the optimal choice of T
1 ;T
2 ;c;d leads to unique
equilibrium, where agents allocate all the funds into R&D, so that x = c,
y = d.
 If 3  2

 1 < R  1 + 2
1
1  then there are two SPNE: (0;0) and (c;c).
 If R  32

 1 then the equilibrium value of investment expenditures is c = 0.
 The agents are treated symmetrically: T
1 = T
2 , c = d.
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The most surprising result of the Proposition 3 is that teams with very high
synergy eects ( close to 1) might end up investing nothing to the research
and development. From the proposition it follows, that the higher is the synergy
eect, the higher should be the price in stake to ensure full-investment equilibrium.
Actually, for  close to 1, the prize should be innitely large to ensure unique (c;c)
equilibrium. For smaller prizes the agents can as well choose equilibrium (0;0).
The intuition for this is that for high synergy eects it is sucient to invest a small
amount in order to have a success with high probability. Hence, the principal will
allocate relatively small c to project and consequently will promise low shares to
the agents. If one of the team peers decides to divert funds, the other has very
10The general form is given in the proof to Proposition 3
14low probability of winning the prize alone, and the share is not large enough to
justify the eort.
However, the equilibrium (0;0) is Pareto-dominated by equilibrium (c;c). In-
deed using the Proposition 3, the expected prot of each agent in the full in-




1  c   1). In equilibrium (0;0) each
agent earns (0;0) = c. It is then straightforward, that (c;c) > (0;0) for any
 2 (0;1] and c > 0.
Many game-theorists, the most prominent among which are Harsanyi and Sel-
ten (1992), consider the Pareto-dominant equilibrium to be a natural focal point
in a game where equilibria are Pareto-ranked.11 The experimental literature, on
the other hand, shows, that in this type of games (called coordination games), the
Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium is not always the unique outcome. However,
according to Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1990) the coordination failure is
likely to happen when decisions of the agents are inuenced by presence of a coop-
erative dominated strategy, which (provided that the agents are able to cooperate)
gives both of them larger payo, than the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Their re-
sults suggest, that otherwise the agents are likely to choose the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium.
As I show below, in the present model collusion between agents would lead
to the full-investment decision, which is also Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the
simultaneous move game. Hence, based on the argument of Harsanyi and Selten
(1992) and the experimental results of Cooper et al. (1990) I will assume, that in
the simultaneous move game the agents are able to choose equilibrium (c;c) over
equilibrium (0;0).12
Let me further notice, that the contract described in Proposition 3 is collusion-
proof in a sense, that if the agents collude, they will choose to invest all funds
in their discretion. Indeed, assume that the agents collude on maximizing joint
prot, which then has to be shared between them. In this case each agent takes
into account a positive externality which his choice of investment has on the joint
prot. An agent's equilibrium investment decision therefore, will be at least as
large, as in the case of self-prot maximization.13 Moreover, as I have shown
11According to Harsanyi and Selten (1992) p.221-223, among two equilibria U and V , equi-
librium U dominates equilibrium V if it results in strictly higher payo for both players. The
authors take a point of view, that \there is no risk involved in a situation, where expectations
can be coordinated by common payo interests of the relevant players".
12Alternatively, to eliminate equilibrium (0;0) I can assume that there are mechanisms, which
prevent the agents from choosing zero investment simultaneously. For example, I can assume
that there are tiny xed costs of running a research laboratory, so that each player has to invest
at least " > 0 into R&D.
13Kandel and Lazear (1992) show more formally, that maximization of a joint surplus in
a team leads to the higher eort level, than the eort level, resulting from individual prot
15above, equilibrium (c;c) generates larger prot, than equilibrium (0;0). This
means, that given contract in place, the colluding agents would prefer to coordinate
on equilibrium (c;c). Hence, given the optimal contract, equilibrium investment
decision of the agents does not depend on whether they collude or not.
6 Team versus competition
In this model the problem of the principal is analyzed in two stages. In the second
stage he chooses optimal contract, taken the structure of research department
(team or competing agents), synergy eect and size of the prize as given. In
the rst stage the principal chooses such structure of research department, which
maximizes his payo, taking  and R as given. The optimal contract for team
and competition was derived in previous sections. Here I will discuss when the
principal prefers to employ a team and when he prefers to employ competing
agents.
The compensation in a setting with competing agents reminds the relative
performance evaluation schemes (RPE). In the literature on contract theory, this
scheme is used to penalize the member of a team, who performs worse than his
pears. This feature is also present in my model: if the agents compete, each of them
is rewarded only if he has better result than his rival (which also means that he wins
the prize and patents the invention). On the other hand, the compensation scheme
in a team rewards each entrepreneur if the whole team performs well; this is so-
called joint performance evaluation (JPE). The insights from the optimal contract
literature suggest that in a one-shot game the optimal payment scheme for teams
is RPE (Holmstrom 1982, Che and Yoo 2001). Intuitively, this conclusion should
also hold if we compare the competing agents and team without synergy eects.
However, when the synergy eects present the team could potentially become an
attractive arrangement, if the increase in success probability due to synergies is
high enough.
In order to compare competitive setting and team, I will rst consider the
benchmark case without moral hazard. Note, if all actions of agents are observ-
able and veriable, then the principal can write a contract specifying the level of
investment, which agents should allocate into the project. Then their reward is
zero for any organizational structure of research unit, and the whole payo from
the projects is retained by the principal. In absence of synergy eect ( = 0), the











16where (c;d) 2 argmaxc;d R(1   e (c+d))   (c + d).
It is clear, that if there are synergy eects ( > 0), then prot of the principal
is larger if he employs team, than if he employs competing agents, since for any c
and d the following inequality holds:

T
P = R(1   e
 (c1 +d1 )
1
1 )   (c + d) > 
C
P = R(1   e
 (c+d))   (c + d):
The picture, however, changes signicantly in the presence of moral hazard.
According to Propositions 2 and 3 the optimal share of agents and investments of
the principal are such that in equilibrium both agents nd it incentive compatible
to invest all funds their receive. Hence, the principal has two mechanisms how to
induce the most ecient investment decision: size of funds and size of share. For
given prize R and synergy eect , the larger is the amount of funds which the
agents receive, the larger is the amount which they can potentially divert from
investing. On the other hand, the larger is their share, the more prone are the
agents to invest as much as they can into R&D. Therefore, the principal always
faces a tradeo between increasing his investment (hence potential probability of
success) and increasing the share of the agents in order to balance the incentive
constraint.
Let us rst consider a case, where  = 0. It is intuitive, that, for a xed R, the
share of a prize, paid to a team should be larger, than the share of a prize paid
to one of the competing agents. On the contrary, the funds which the principal
invests in the optimum should be smaller in the former case. This is the natural
result of free-riding, inherited in JPE scheme. Consequently, the prot of the
principal should be larger, if he employs competing agents, than if he employs a
team without synergy eect. This intuition is conrmed by Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. Assume, there are no synergies eect in team, i.e.  = 0. Then the
following statements hold:
1. The principal invests less funds in R&D if he employs a team, than if he
employs competing agents.
2. A share of the prize which is to be paid to the agents in case of success is
larger if the team is employed.
3. The expected prot of the principal is smaller if he employs a team, than if
he employs competing agents.
It is surprising, that the conclusion of the above proposition does not change
much for  > 0. Figure 1 shows combinations of  and R, such that the principal
is indierent between team and competition (the graph corresponds to the equa-
tion T
P (;R) C
P (R) = 0). In the region above the line, team is more benecial
17arrangement, than competition and below the line the latter is preferred to the for-
mer. Recall, that I restrict the analysis of the team behavior to the full-investment
equilibrium (c;c).
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Figure 1: Competing agents versus team.
Competing agents will never be employed, if R  2 (on the Figure 1 the
corresponding regions are labelled a and c). On the other hand, the team will
never be employed, if R  32

1  (the region corresponds to the union of a and b
on the picture). Let me dene k :=
log3 log2
log3  0:369. If  > k, then 3  2

1  < 2
and for all 3  2

1  < R < 2 the principal can employ team, but not competing
agents or a single agent (region c). The principal will not nance a project, if
3  2

1  > R (region a). If   k, then 3  2

1   2 and the principal will employ
competing agents (but not a team) for all values of R, such that 2 < R < 3  2

1 
(the corresponding region is b). When the parameters R and  are such that both
the team and competing agents generate a positive prot, the principal chooses
an arrangement, which maximizes his own surplus from the project.
Consider now R > 2, so that nancing of competing agents is feasible. As
becomes clear from the picture, the team is never a preferred arrangement, if the
synergy eects are moderate (  0:369). But even for signicant synergy eects,
team is not always better than competition, despite of the technological advan-
tages. For the xed , as R increases, the competition becomes more attractive.
The reason is that as the value of prize in stake is high, the principal is willing to
increase his investment in order to reach higher success probability. But this also
means that he has to promise a higher share to the agents in order to balance their
incentive compatibility constraint. If the synergy eects are high in the team, the
agents can generate a high probability of success by investing only small amount
of resources. Hence, it is very tempting for them to divert fraction of funds and
therefore the incentive compatible share must be too large, comparing to a struc-
18ture with competing agents. This leads us to somewhat surprising conclusion.
The model suggests, that we should observe the research teams, nanced by a
third party (venture capitalist, grant agency, etc.), only if the synergy eects of
team production are signicant or if the prize is not too large. For large prize
and moderate synergy eect we should most of the time observe the principals,
nancing competing agents.
This result is quite counterintuitive. No doubt, there are numerous cases in
the practice of R&D nancing, when the principal nances competing projects
in order to choose then the best output. Nevertheless, it is much more common
to see a principal nancing a research team, then competing research units. In
the following sections I investigate alternative structure, which can under certain
conditions increase the attractiveness of a team to the principal.
7 Team with a hierarchical structure
There are several mechanisms, which can reduce the moral hazard within a team
and hence increase the surplus of the principal. Important feature of the team
work is that agents can often observe the action of their peers, even when the
principal cannot. Che and Yoo (2001) show that repeated interaction with a team
increases the attractiveness of the team to a principal. In the repeated setting, if
one of the team members is observed to shirk during some period of interaction,
he is punished by the penalty strategy of his peer, which generates the worst
sustainable payo for each member. This \reputation eect" deters agents from
shirking and allows the principal to increase his payo from a project.
In my model, however, I concentrate on one-time interaction between the prin-
cipal and the agents. Namely, the interaction will be terminated, as soon as the
project succeeds or as soon as the maximal nancing horizon elapses. An example
of such relationship could be an interaction between a venture capitalist and a
rm. It will most of the time be terminated as soon as a rm is taking to IPO or
merged with other company.
In the static setting the ability of the team members to monitor each other can
still be useful, if it creates a potential for peer pressure. There is a considerable
literature on how the peer pressure improves the incentives of team members.
This literature usually assumes, that team members are able to commit to punish
the free riders, because they derive positive utility from punishing. Further, the
punishment is often considered to be non-pecuniary, such as \mental or physical
harassment" (Kandel and Lazear 1992, Baron and Gjerde 1997).
There are also papers, which consider the eect of the monetary punishment
on the performance of the team. In this case the punishment is executed by the
principal, but only if he has veriable evidence that an agent shirks. This evidence
19he obtains from reports of the team mates of the agent. Marx and Squintani (2002)
show that by including a requirement to monitor and to report on his peer in a
contract of each team member, the principal can reach the rst-best outcome.
However, while such \spying" can be justied in some environments, it can be
totally inappropriate in the environments, where people feel guilty for spying on
their team members.
I will assume that in my model due to prohibitively large moral costs it is not
possible to execute a peer pressure or to write a contract between the principal
and agents, which requires agents to monitor and to report on their peers. In such
environment an agent can impose a punishment on his team mate only if he has a
principal position, i.e., a position of the manager of the research department, the
head of the research team, etc. By organizing the research team as a hierarchy, the
original principal can utilize ability of agents to observe the eort of their peers by
giving an agent on the higher hierarchy level a competence to punish his shirking
team mates on the lower level of the hierarchy. Intuitively, that should decrease
the moral hazard on behalf of the agents on the lower level of hierarchy.
Hence, in the next sections I will investigate an alternative structure of a team,
which is further referred to as a hierarchical team. In this setting, only one agent
interacts directly with the principal. He also has a discretion to decide, whether
to employ the second agent and which contract oer to him. In fact, he acts as
a principal with respect to the second agent. However, whether the team should
be organized as a hierarchy, or whether the team members should be employed on
equal conditions, is a decision to be made by the original principal, based on his
prot maximization problem. I will consider two cases: the case where the rst
agent (the team leader) can, without incurring any costs, observe and verify the
eort of the second agent (subordinate), and the case where this is not possible.
The timing of the game, in case when the principal opts for a team with
hierarchy, is the following:
1. The principal signs a contract (R1;c) with the team leader (A1).
2. A1 decides whether to stay alone or to employ the second agent (A2).
3. If A2 is employed, then he and A1 sign a contract (R12;d  c).
4. A1 chooses level of investment x  c   d.
5. A2 chooses level of investment y  d.
6. The outcome is realized and the payos are distributed
In the following discussion I will distinguish between case, where stages 4 and
5 are simultaneous and a case, when they are sequential.
207.1 No moral hazard on behalf of agent A2
Let me rst consider a situation, where the team leader can, without incurring any
costs, perfectly observe and verify the investment decision of the subordinate. This
is likely to be the case, since, unlike the principal, the team leader understands
the nature of the project and is working knee to knee with his employee. Hence,
the contract between two can be written upon the observable and veriable eort
(i.e., investment level) of A2. Since A1 can perfectly observe the eort of his team
mate, he can impose a prohibitively large punishment, if the latter diverts part
of funds for own consumption.14 In this case, the second agent does not earn
any rent (R12 = 0) and will invest y = d into the project. Note, that since A2
always invests all funds in his discretion, it is not essential, whether the investment
decision is made sequentially or simultaneously.
Agent A1 is obviously better o by employing A2, than pursuing the project
alone, while in the former case he can gain from synergy eects and does not have
to pay any rent for this. The problem of A1 has the following form (in H
1 , the
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s:t: x + d  c
In the optimal solution to this problem x = d, because for any x + d  c, the





1  . The principal
will choose the level of investment c and the share R1 so that all funds are
invested, which implies, that x = d = c
2. This arrangement is obviously more
benecial for the principal, than the team with equal partners. In the latter case,
both agents sign a contract with the principal, and since the principal does not
observe their eort, he has to pay a rent to both agents. If, however, A1 observes
the eort of A2, the moral hazard on behalf of the latter agent is eliminated and
the principal has to provide incentives only to one agent. The problem of the
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14I assume, that there is a mechanism that I do not model or investigate in details, which
allows a team leader to punish his subordinate, if he observes that the latter shirks.











The threshold value of R, starting from which the project will be nanced, is
~ R = 2  2

 1. Note, that since ~ R < 2 for any  2 [0;1), it is never the case, that
the principal decides to invest c > 0 if he employs competing agents, but invests
zero if he employs a team.15 Note also, that since ~ R < ^ R for any  2 [0;1), the
principal will nance the team with hierarchy more often (i.e. for larger range of
parameters), than the team with equal partners.16
Comparing the optimal contracts for two alternative team structures17, it is
easy to see, that for any given investment level c the principal pays a half share of
the prize to the agents in case of hierarchical team, than in case of equal-partners
team. At the same time, for given value of total investment expenditures the
probability of success is the same. Indeed, for both alternative team structures
the optimal contract leads to the full investment equilibrium, where resources are
allocated in most ecient manner between the agents (i.e. x = y). The nal
conclusion is, that if the principal can ensure, that agents observe each other
eort, he will prefer to organize his research team as a hierarchy. In this hierarchy
he interacts directly only with the rst agent, who execute a monitoring function
over the second agent. Such structure allows to decrease the moral hazard problem
and increases attractiveness of a team.
7.2 Non-observable eort of A2
If the eort of the second agent is not observable, the problem becomes signicantly
more complicated. Agent A1 now has three decisions to made: whether to employ
A2 or to develop the project alone, the design of the optimal contract (provided,
that A2 was employed) and own investment decision. The game is solved by
backward induction. The problem of the second agent is to choose the optimal
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15Recall, that this was not the case for team with equal partners
16 ^ R = 3  2

 1 is a threshold value for team with equal partners, see Section 5.
17The optimal contract for equal partners team is developed in Section 5.
22I have extensively discussed on several occasions, why the principal will always
choose such a share and investment, that the agents nd it just incentive compat-
ible to invest all funds which they receive into R&D (see for example the proof of
Proposition 1 and the discussion in Section 3). The same argument applies to the
case when the rst agent acts as a principal to the second agent. A1 will choose
such combination (2;d), that for any given x the second agent will nd it just
incentive compatible to allocate all funds, which he receives, into R&D. Hence,
the rst order condition
@H
2
@y = 0 will be satised at the boundary y = d of the
set [0;d]. For the ease of notation I will dene t := (x1  +y1 )
1
1 . Then, I can





There are two remarks, which arise from the investigation of the agents' problem.
Remark 1. If A1 decides to employ A2, he will never choose zero level of investment.
When the second agent is employed, he has to be paid a share 2 of R1 in
case of success. Suppose, A1 does not invest anything in the project. Then, the
probability of success is determined by the investments of the second agent: p =
1 e y. However, if A1 decides not to employ A2, he can achieve the same success
probability by investing x = y and he does not have to pay a share to the second
agent. Hence, if A1 employs A2 he will invest x > 0 into the project. Note, that
this is a special case of the following result: A1 will always invest at least as much
as A2, so that x  y. Indeed, the probability of success p = (1   e(x1 +y1 )
1
1 )
is symmetric in x and y. On the other hand, a share which has to be paid to A2
increases in y. Hence, if A1 wants to implement the total amount of investment
x + y, he is better of choosing such contract and level of investment, that x  y.
Remark 2. If the agents do not observe each other eort, then with respect to their
investment decision, they play a simultaneous move game. Note, that any outcome
of that game the principal can replicate, by contracting the agents himself, so that
agent A1 will be oered a contract (R1(1   2); c   d) and agent A2 will be
oered a contract (R12;d). Hence, if in the hierarchical team neither of the
agents observe an eort of his partner, the principal can do at least as well by
employing a team with equal partners.
The hierarchical team, however, may give the team leader (i.e. agent A1) a
possibility to make his eort observable his subordinate. Most obviously, he can
complete part of the project and present results to his employee. Alternatively,
the team leader can commit to invest certain amount of eort by committing part
of investment resources to the project (buying computers, nancing the research
23laboratory, etc.) and making that decision known to his team mate. Interestingly,
if it is at all possible for the team leader to make his eort observable to his
team pear, either by performing part of job, or by committing money, he prefers
to do that. Indeed, that allows the team leader to play sequential move game
with respect to investment decision, rather than simultaneous move game. And in
sequential game he can reach at least as large prot, as in the simultaneous move
game.18 The question now remains, whether the principal would ever prefer to
employ a hierarchical team, if he understands, that this structure allows the team
leader to make his eort observable to the second agent.
Assuming, that the choice of investment is sequential, it is possible to construct




1 = R1(1   2)(1   e t) + c   (d + x) (4)





t et;y = d
0  d  t; x  0
d + x = d + (t1    d1 )
1
1   c:
This problem has a complicated rst-order condition and is not tractable for
all value of . However, investigation of the rst-order conditions, allows to make
a number of propositions about the investment decisions of the agents.
Case 1:  = 0
If there are no synergy eects in team production, then the probability of
success is p(x;y) = 1   e (x+y), where x + y  c. In this case it is obvious, that
A1 will never employ A2. In stand-alone situation he can implement the same
probability of success and he does not have to pay a share to his employee.
As for the principal in this situation, he is better o by employing a single
agent A1, than a team with equal partners. Indeed, the probability of success is
the same in both settings, but there is double moral hazard in the latter case.
However, according to Corollary 1, the principal receives even higher prot by
employing competing agents.
Case 2:  > 0.
In the presence of technological benets of team production, agent A1 faces a
complicated tradeo. He can employ agent A2 and allow him to allocate part of
18If x is the optimal investment choice of the team leader in the sequential move game, than
for any (x;y) holds 1(x;y(x))  1(x;y), where 1(x;y) is prot of the team leader.
24investment funds into the project, which will increase the probability of success
due to synergy eect. However, he also has to promise A2 a share of the prize,
large enough to deter the latter from consuming the investment funds. Hence,
by employing the second agent, A1 suers twice: he has to give away part of the
funds, which he otherwise could consume himself, and he has to give up part of
the reward in case of success. It is therefore intuitive, that A1 should be reluctant
to employ A2 and if he does employ him, then it is reasonable to expect, that the
latter will be allocated only a small part of total investment funds.
In the solution to A1's maximization problem (4), the derivatives with respect







































@d is decreasing in d, then agent A1 will optimally decide not
to employ the second agent. On the other hand, if he chooses to cooperate with
the second agent, then the derivative must necessarily increase for some d.
Lemma 1. If A1 employs A2 in equilibrium, then the optimal solution to the
maximization problem (4) will be reached in the interior of the feasible set, so that
@H
1




Proposition 4. For the team with hierarchical structure the following statements
hold:
1. Agent A1 will not employ agent A2, whenever    , where    0:432 solves
the equation 1   (1   )

2 1 + (1 + (1   )
1 
2 1) = 0.
2. If A1 employs A2, then the allocation of investment resources between agents
is suboptimal, i.e. d < x.
The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix A. Let me rst notice,
that the hierarchical team is an inecient arrangement. Due to the suboptimal
allocation of resources between the agents, it generates a smaller probability of
success for given c, then the alternative team structure. In Appendix, I illustrate
the allocation of funds in case of team with hierarchy for  = 2
3 (see Figure 4)19
This example shows, that A1 is willing to transfer the second agent only small
19Using Lemma 1 above, it is straightforward to derive R1 as function of t. This relationship
can be used then to recover equilibrium x and d. Complete solution for  = 2
3 is provided in the
proof of Corollary 3 in Appendix.
25fraction of the investment recourses, which he obtains from the principal. In other
words, A1 makes only a minor use of the synergy eects, compared with optimal
allocation x = d.20 The unwillingness of A1 to share is the source of ineciency
in the hierarchical team. If the principal employs hierarchical team, then in order
to achieve the same probability of success as in team with equal partners, he has
to invest more in the former case, which increases his investment costs.
This ineciency of hierarchical team has also an implication for the decision
of agent A1 to employ the second agent. The rst statement of the Proposition
4 suggests, that when the synergy eects are moderate, then from the point of
view of agent A1 the contribution of A2 to the project is not sucient to justify
the costs, connected with his employment. Note, however, that when the principal
himself employs both agents, he allocates the investment resources in most ecient
manner, so that agents invest equal amounts. In this case, due to the optimal use
of synergy eect, the participation of the second agent in the project has more
sound eect on the probability of success. A1 never employs the second agent for
   , where    0:432. However, the original principal would have nanced
a team with equal partners for the same synergy eect, if the value of price in
stake were large enough to justify investment costs.21 Moreover, there exist a set
of (;R) with    , such that the principal would actually prefer to employ a
team, rather than competing agents.22
The continuity of prot function H
1 also ensures, that the rst agent might end
up not employing agent A2 even for the synergy eects  >  . To illustrate this,
I show in the Appendix, that for  = 0:5, the rst agent will prefer to stay alone,
if the value of prize in stake R is larger, than 14:490. It is quite intuitive, that
for moderate synergy eects agent A1 is reluctant to employ agent A2, if the prize
in stake increases. Indeed, the principal is willing to invest more in the project,
if the prize in stake is large. He also has to balance the incentive constraint by
oering a larger reward to the agents. Agent A1 has both investment resources and
the reward at his discretion. This amount of money at hand makes his tradeo
between increasing the probability of success by employing the second agent and
increasing own utility by consuming the funds, ever more complicated. Hence, for
R large enough he may prefer to undertake the project alone.
The bottom line from the Proposition 4 is, that for \large" set of parameters
(;R), the hierarchical team structure is not feasible to the principal in a sense,
that in equilibrium the rst agent will not employ the second agent. If agent A1
does employ agent A2, then the allocation of resources between them is suboptimal,
which leads to the loss of eciency in terms of success probability.
20This allocation is optimal from the eciency point of view, because it maximizes the prob-
ability of success for given amount of investment resources.
21This follows from Proposition 3.
22See Figure 1 in Section 6.
26Consider now such (;R), that the hierarchical team is feasible for the princi-
pal. Which team structure serves him better, depends on combination of param-
eters  and R. However, intuition suggests, that the outcome of the hierarchical
team may be better than the outcome of the equal partners team, only if it leads
to the investment decision, which the principal is not able to replicate in the corre-
sponding simultaneous move game. In other words, if for xed (R1(1 2);R12)
an equilibrium in the hierarchical team is situated to the right from an equilibrium
in the team with equal partners, than there is a possibility, that hierarchical team
generates larger prot to the principal.23
More formally, assume that the optimal contract in the case of hierarchical
team requires, that the agents A1 and A2 are paid (R1(1 2);R12) respectively.
Let (xh;yh) be the equilibrium investment of agents A1 and A2 in the hierarchical
team. Similarly, let (xt;yt) be the equilibrium investments of agents in the equal
partners team with shares xed to (R1(1   2);R12). Then, if xh  xt, the
principal can replicate the outcome of the hierarchical team by signing a contract
with the agents, where A1 is allocated an amount c = xh and A2 is allocated
d = yh, while the shares are (R1(1   2);R12). If this is the case, then the
hierarchical team does not have any advantages from the principal's point of view.
Consider now the situation, where xh > xt (see Figure 5 in Appendix for illus-
tration). In this case the team leader overinvests in the project, comparing with
his best response function. In other words, given the corresponding investment
choice of the agent A2, the team leader (agent A1) would prefer to execute lower
level of eort. However, given the sequential structure of the investment, he can-
not change his investment decision. Moreover, the principal cannot replicate the
outcome of this game by signing a contract with each agent separately. Indeed,
in the equilibrium of the corresponding simultaneous move game, xt < xh. Natu-
rally, in team with equal partners, the principal can implicate the probability of
success ph, which corresponds to investment level (xh;yh). Since the principal al-
ways allocates resources in the most ecient manner (which is not the case in the
hierarchical team), he can achieve the probability ph by incurring smaller costs.
However, the principal also has to adjust the rewards of agents appropriately. In
particulary, the reward of the agent A2 must be increased, since eciency requires
that he is allocated larger amount of resources, than he receives in team with
hierarchy. Let the sum of these adjusted shares be RT. If the principal employs
hierarchical team, he has to pay a reward of R1. If RT > R1 and the dierence
in the investment costs is not too large, than the principal may prefer to employ
a hierarchical team, rather than a team with equal partners. The corollary below
proves this intuition.
23The illustration of such case is provided in Appendix, see Figure 5.
27Corollary 3. There exists an open set of parameters (;R), such that the hier-
archical team is feasible to the principal, and he prefers to employ a hierarchical
team, rather than team with equal partners.
In Appendix, I provide a proof of this corollary by a mean of example. I show,
that for  = 2
3 the principal will nance a hierarchical team for  2 (0:734;0:75],
while for this range of parameters he will set c = 0 in case of team with equal
partners. For  2 (0:75;0:895) both teams are feasible, but prot of the principal
is larger under hierarchical team. By continuity, this result also holds in the open
set around  = 2
3.
The choice between hierarchical team and team with equal partners depends on
the balance between eciency of R&D and power of incentives. For small values
of R the principal might prefer to nance a hierarchical team, if the team leader
is prepared to overinvest in the sequential equilibrium, compared with his best re-
sponse reaction. Indeed, for low values of R the principal is only willing to invest
little resources in the project. This implies, that probability of success is small,
even when resources are allocated eciently. Hence, if agent A1 has incentives to
invest intensively in the hierarchical team and the increase in eciency due to the
optimal allocation of resources is not signicant, then the principal might prefer
the latter structure over the team with equal partners. However, intuition and
the examples in Appendix suggest, that the range of parameters, where hierar-
chical team performs better is small. As the prize in stake increases, so does the
equilibrium investment expenditures of the principal. The eciency becomes now
an important issue, because increase in the success probability due to the optimal
allocation of funds becomes more signicant. It is obvious, that the principal will
never employ the hierarchial team, if he has to give up a larger share of the prize,
than with the alternative team structure. But also when the opposite is the case,
he will prefer to employ the team with equal partners, when the eciency gain is
large enough to justify the reward of the agents. In my examples, the principal
will always prefer the team with equal partners, if  = 0:5. If  = 2
3, he will prefer
a team with equal partners over the hierarchical team for R > 0:895.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate four dierent organizational structures of the research
and development in the framework where the nancing decisions (made by a prin-
cipal) and allocation decisions (made by agents) are separated. The allocation
decision is not observable to the principal, which creates a moral hazard problem.
The common implication for the contract between the principal and agents in all
four cases is, that when the principal decides to increase amount of nances, al-
located to the project, he also has to increase a reward of the agents, which they
28obtain in case of success. Otherwise, they tend to consume part of funds, instead
of allocating them into R&D.
However, dierent structures have dierent eect on the incentives, which leads
to decrease or increase in the rent, allocated to the agents. Competition between
agents proves to be a strong incentive device. Despite the duplication of research
costs, it leads to a signicant decrease in agents' rents, so that the principal will
always prefers employing competing agents, rather than a single agent.
Comparing with competition, the team production may have large synergy ef-
fects, which result in higher probability of success for the same amount of funds,
allocated to the R&D. However, team production suers from the free-riding prob-
lem, which increases incentive compatible reward of the agents, comparing with
the competitive structure. The model therefore predicts, that the principal will
prefer to use team structure, only if the synergy eects are signicant or the prize
is not too large. For moderate synergy eects and large value of the prize, the
principal will rather employ competing agents.
If, however, one of the agents is able to observe the eort of the other agent,
then the principal can improve performance of the team if he assigns the former
agent to a principal position (position of a team leader). This agent acts as a
second principal to his team pear. He determines the optimal contract (share of
the prize and the investment resources), which the latter receives, and can impose
a prohibitively large punishment for if he detects shirking. Since the team leader is
able to perfectly observe eort of the other agent, the contract between them will
be written upon observable eort and the moral hazard on behalf of the second
agent will be eliminated.
On the other hand, if the agents cannot observe each other eorts, then (from
the principal's point of view) the hierarchical team does not have any benets,
comparing to the case where the principal contracts the agents himself. However,
hierarchical team structure may provide the team leader an opportunity to make
his eort observable to another agent, either by completing part of the project, or
by committing resources to it. If this is the case, then this team structure may
still prove to be superior to the equal-partners team, if it results in equilibrium,
which the principal cannot replicate by contracting the agents himself. It follows
from the analysis, that this will be the case, only if the team leader is willing to
overinvest in equilibrium, compared to his best response reaction.
Although sometimes the hierarchical team structure gives the team leader pow-
erful incentives to invest in the project, it also leads to a suboptimal allocation of
funds and a signicant loss of eciency in terms of success probability. The team
leader is reluctant to involve another agent into the project. Although the joint
probability of success could be increased by allocating more funds to the second
29agent24, he also has to be rewarded for his eort by receiving a larger share in case
of success. On the other hand, the team leader can increase his own utility by
consuming these funds, and in addition he could enjoy the larger share of a prize.
Hence, he will only distribute a minor part of funds to the second agent. There-
fore, for xed amount of investment expenditures, the hierarchical team leads to
much lower success probability than a team, with equal partners.
Due to the low eciency of a hierarchical team, the team leader will not em-
ploy the second agent for large set of parameters (for example, when  < 0:43).
For (;R), which belong to this set, the hierarchical team is not feasible to the
principal. On the other hand, for the same set of parameters, the team with equal
partners team may perform even better than competition, due to the ecient al-
location of investment resources. The model also suggests, that even when both
alternative team structures are feasible to the principal, he should most of the
time structure his research team as a team with equal partners. The reason is
that as the prize increases, the principal is willing to allocate more resources into
the project. This implies, that increase in probability of success due to the opti-
mal allocation of these resources becomes signicant and overweighs any positive
eect, which the hierarchical team might have on the incentives of the leader.
An implication of the model is, that in environments, where the team leader
has diculties monitoring his team mates, one should expect to observe team
leader executing disproportional large eort. On the contrary, other members of
the team should only perform a minor work.
Another implication of this model for the practice of R&D nancing is that
the nanciers (e.g. grant agencies, venture capitalists, rms, subcontracting R&D)
should encourage the information exchange and transparency within the research
team. Even if this transparency does not increase ability of the nanciers to
observe eorts, they can benet from it indirectly by using the hierarchical team
structure. On the other hand, if due to working conditions or very dierent job
tasks the agents are not able to observe or understand amount of eort, imputed
by their team pears, the nanciers should most of the time organize their research
unit as a team with equal partners, rather than hierarchy. Especially when the
team members cannot observe each other eort, competition may be a superior
organizational structure, if the synergy eects in team are moderate and the prize
in stake is large enough.
24For each amount of money, which the rst agent is ready to allocate to the project, the
probability of success is maximized, if both agents invest half of that amount.
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32A Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
As a rst step, I will show that the recourse constraint RCS binds in optimum.
Assume, that c is large enough, so that RCS does not bind. Denote f(x) =
R(1   (x))(1   e x), where R(x)  ex according to ICS. The problem of






I will denote the solution to this problem as ^ x. Note, that the prot of the
principal decreases in c. Hence, optimal c is such, that c = ^ x and the prot of the
principal is f(^ x)   ^ x.
Assume now, that for any x the principal chooses c so, that the RCS is also






Denoting the solution to this problem as x, I can write the expected prot of
the principal as f(x) x. Note, that since x = argmaxf(x) x, for any ^ x holds
the following inequality: f(x)   x  f(^ x)   ^ x. Hence, the principal will always
choose c such, that the recourse constraint is binding.
Further, assume, that (ICS) is not binding, so that R > ec. This however,
cannot be an optimum, because for any R > ec the agent will choose the level
of investment x = c, so that the probability of success does not change. However,
the principal can increase his prot by decreasing R. Hence, in optimum the
principal will choose such  and c, that R = ec, i.e. (ICS) constraint will be
binding.




P = R(1   )(1   e x) + c   x
s:t: (ICS) R = ex;
(RCS) x = c;
(CSS) (R   ex)(x   c) = 0:
33The solution to this problem is c = ln 1
2( 1 +
p
1 + 4R). For any R > 2, c is
positive.
Proof of Proposition 2
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y2   x + ex+yx + xy
;
(RCC1) x  c;






x2   y + ex+yy + xy
!






y2   x + ex+yx + xy
!
(d   y) = 0:
According to incentive compatibility constraints ICC1 and ICC2 the agents
choose their investment x and y to maximize their expected utility. On the other
hand, since all available funds come from the principal, the agents cannot invest
more then c, respectively d, which is described by recourse constraints RCC1 and
RCC2. Finally, complementary slackness conditions CSC1 and CSC2 ensures that
at least one of constrains ICC1;RCC1 and ICC2;RCC2 is binding. If RCC1 does
not bind, than ICC1 must necessarily be binding. On the other hand, if ICC1
does not bind, then RCC1 must be binding according to equilibrium conditions
(the same holds for ICC2 and RCC2).
I will develop a proof in several steps.
Step 1.
All constrains will be binding, which follows from the same argument as in the
proof to Proposition 1.
Step 2.







x2   y + ex+yy + xy
 
ex+y(x + y)2
y2   x + ex+yx + xy
!
(1   e (x+y))   (x + y):
I take the rst-order condition w.r.t. x and y and expressing R, so that I
receive the system of equation25:
R = F1(x;y);R = F2(x;y):
Subtracting second equation from the rst one I receive the following expression:
ex+y(ex+y   1)2(x   y)(x + y)3( 1 + ex+y   (x + y))(ex+y + x + y   1)
(y2 + x(y + ex+y   1))2(( 1 + ex+y)y + x(x + y))2 = 0:
The above equality holds, if the following conditions are satised:
1. (y2 + x(y + ex+y   1))2(( 1 + ex+y)y + x(x + y))2 6= 0,
2. ex+y(ex+y   1)(x   y)(x + y)3( 1 + ex+y   (x + y))2(ex+y + x + y   1) = 0
From the rst condition it follows, that x 6=  y. The second part holds true if at
least one of the following conditions is satised:
1. x = y,
2. x =  y
3.  1 + ex+y + x + y = 0,
4.  1 + ex+y   (x + y) = 0.
Condition 2 is ruled out based on result that x 6=  y. For simplicity I will denote
x + y := a. Condition 4 holds i a = 0, implying x =  y, which we have ruled
out. Indeed, denoting, it is easy to see that the function f(a) = ea   a   1
reaches it's unique minimum at 0, so that f(0) = 0. As for condition 3, the
function g(a) = ea + a   1 is strictly increasing in a, and there is unique solution
of g(a) = 0, namely a = 0, which is impossible due to result x 6=  y. Hence, it
necessarily must be, that condition 1 holds, i.e. x = y. This automatically implies,
that R1 = R2 and c = d = x = y. Hence the agents are oered a symmetric
contract.
Step 3.
25The equations are straightforward to receive, but too cumbersome to present them in the
paper




P = R(1   C)(1   e 2x)   2c
s:t RC =
e2x4x2
2x2   x + e2xx
;
x = c:
The solution to the problem is given by
R =
e2c (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c   1)2 (5)





(e2c + 2c   1)2:
It is straightforward to verify, that both function on the right-hand side of the
equation increase in c.
Step 4.
Recall, that I assume, R > 2. Now let us to verify, that optimal contract
c = d, RC
1 = RC
2 := RC =
4c
1   e 2c + 2ce 2c, where c is given by Equation
(5) leads to unique SPNE. Equilibria (x;0),(0;y),(c;y),(x;d) are ruled out because
the agents are treated symmetrically, so that x = y in SPNE.
There are two possibilities left: (0;0) and (c;c). Recall (see Table 1), that
equilibrium (0;0) will be played i RC  1. However, c > 0 for any R > 2. And
c > 0 implies, that RC > 1. To see this, note, that RC is increasing in c and
RC ! 1 as c ! 0. Hence for any R > 2, (0;0) will not be played in equilibrium.
Therefore the optimal contract, described in Proposition 2 leads to unique SPNE
(c;c).
Proof of Corollary 1
For clarity of notations I will denote as t the amount of nance which a single
agent receive and c the amount of nance which each of competing agents receives.
The amount of nance and shares of agents are determined from the following
expressions (see Proposition 1 and Proposition 2):
R = e
t(1 + e
t); RS = et (6)
R =
e2c (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c   1)2 ; RC =
4ce2c
e2c + 2c   1
(7)
36I will rst prove that according to the optimal contract the principal invests
less if he employs a single entrepreneur, than if he employs competing agents, i.e.
2c > t. Assume on the contrary that 2c  t. I will show that, contrary to (6) and




e2c (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c   1)2 (8)
Note, that it is enough to prove, that (8) holds for t = 2c. Plugging t = 2c
into (8) and rearranging the terms I obtain the following inequality:
(1 + e
2c)(e
2c + 2c   1)
2 > 4c(e





I will denote the function on the left-hand side as L(c) = (1+e2c)(e2c+2c 1)2
and the function on the right-hand side as R(c) = (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c)).
Note, that L(0) = R(0) = 0. I will prove now that for any c > 0, L0(c) > R0(c),
which implies that for any c > 0, L(c) > R(c). Taking the respective derivatives,
I obtain:
L
0(c) = 2( 1 + 2c + e








4c + c(2 + 6e
2c)):
Both these derivatives are positive for any c > 0. Subtracting R0(c) from L0(c)
I obtain the following function:
f(c) = 2e
2c( 4c
2 + 8c( 1 + e
2c) + 3( 1 + e
2c)
2):
Since f(0) = 0, it is enough to show that function monotonically increases for
c > 0 in order to prove that for any c > 0, f(c) > 0. The rst derivative of the




2c   2) > 0:






e2c (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c   1)2 :
This, however, contradicts the conditions (6) and (7), which should be satised
simultaneously for given R. Hence, it must be, that 2c > t.
Next, I will show, that conditions (6) and (7) imply that RC < RS. Suppose
on the contrary, RC  RS. Then it is enough to show, that for RC = RS,




e2c (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c   1)2 :
37If RC = RS, then et =
4ce2c
e2c + 2c   1
. Substituting this to the expression for
R, given by (6) I obtain the following expression:
R =
4ce2c




e2c + 2c   1
!
:
On the other hand, according to (7),
R =
e2c (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c   1)2 :
However, it is not possible that these two equalities are satised simultaneously.
Indeed, I will show, that for any c > 0 holds the inequality:
4ce2c




e2c + 2c   1
!
<
e2c (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))







To prove that the last inequality holds for any c > 0, I will take the derivatives
of the function l(c) = 4c2 + 8c2e2c and r(c) = 3e4c   6e2c + 3 and compare them
(notice, that l(0) = r(0) = 0). The derivatives are l0(c) = 4(2c + 4ce2c + 4c2e2c)
and r0(c) = 4(3e4c   3e2c). Comparing l0(c) and r0(c) I establish the following:
l
0(c) < r
0(c) , 2c < e
2c(3e
2c   4c
2 + 3 + 4c): (9)
Obviously, 2c < e2c for any c > 0. Also, 3e2c > 4c2 for any c > 0. Hence,









e2c + 2c   1
!
<
e2c (4c(e2c   1) + 3(e2c   1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c   1)2 ;
which contradicts (6) and (7). Therefore, I conclude, that it must be that RC <
RS.
I have proved, that the principal invests more in case of competing agents
(2c > t), so that the probability of success is higher than in single-agent case.
On the other hand, the share of a prize which would be paid in case of success is
smaller if competing agents are employed (C < S). According to Propositions




P = R(1   
C)(1   e
 2c)   2c = (R  
4ce2c





P = R(1   
S)(1   e
 t)   t = (R   e
t)(1   e
 t)   t:
38First, let me notice, that S
P(t) is increasing in t. Indeed, the derivative of the
function is Re t   et which is positive, if R > e2t. According to optimal contract,
R = et(1 + et), which indeed implies R > e2t. Hence, I can write the inequality:
(R   e
2c)(1   e
 2c)   2c > (R   e
t)(1   e
 t)   t:
Further, notice, that e2c > et >
4ce2c
e2c + 2c   1





e2c + 2c   1
!
(1   e
 2c)   2c > (R   e
2c)(1   e
 2c)   2c >






Production function and probability of success in team
For consistency of presentation I will start the discussion with the case of one
agent. Assume, that in order to produce an output the agent needs to acquire
two skills or production factors, such as capital, which I will call \K" and labor
\L". He allocates the available budget x in order to acquire these skills. The cost
of skill K is p > 1 and the cost of skill L is normalized to 1. Assume further,
that the production function has a CES form f(K;L) = (K1 +L1 )
1
1 , where
0   < 1 is a degree of complementarity between K and L. Hence, the agent
faces a following maximization problem:
max
K;L f(K;L) = (K1  + L1 )
1
1 
s:t: pK + L = x:






















This output converges to x, as p goes to innity. Therefore, the agent who disposes
a budget x and chooses his factors of production optimally, will produce the output
of value x, if the price of one factor is innitely large. This output determines the
probability of success p(x) in a way, which I have already discussed earlier:
p(x) = 1   e
 x:
39The output x can be interpreted as a \knowledge" or productivity, which the agent
acquires while investing in factors. This productivity determines the parameter
of Poisson distribution so, that the average number of success in unit of time is x
and the expected time before rst success is 1=x.
Consider now the problem of two agents who jointly maximize the team output.
Let one of them have a budget x and another y. One agent invests in K1 and L1,
where cost of K1 is p > 1 and cost of L1 is 1 and the other agent invests in K2




f() = ((K1 + K2)1  + (L1 + L2)1 )
1
1 ; (10)
s:t: pK1 + L1 = x;
K2 + pL2 = y:
The complete solution to this maximization problem is developed below. Here
I will discuss the result and the intuition behind it. The problem does not have
an interior solution, and depending on values of parameters p and , the optimal























































This optimal solution has the following property. If the budgets of two agents




, then the agents specialize and each
invests in his cheapest factor of production. If, however, one of the agents has too
small budget, so that x




, then he specializes in his the cheapest
factor, while his team mate invests in both factors. Then the output at optimal
allocation has the following form:
f(x;y) =
8
> > > > > > <



































40If p ! 1, then both agents specialize in their cheapest factor of production






If we interpret this output as a parameter of the Poisson distribution, then the
probability that team reaches a success before time T = 1 elapses is:




Hence, the specication of synergy eect in team, which I have chosen, reects
a case when each of two agents is \talented" in dierent skill or production factor,
and joint production is maximized, when each agent specializes in his cheapest
factor. Note, that if both factors are equally expensive, so that price of K and L
can be normalized to 1, then no specialization occurs and optimal production has
a form f(x;y) = x + y so that probability of success is
p(x;y) = 1   e
 (x+y):
Solution to the maximization problem (10)
From the set up of problem (10) and the fact, that the amount of factors
is always nonnegative, it is clear that the solution should satisfy the following
constraint:
L1 2 [0;x];K2 2 [0;y]:
Given this constraints, it is easy to show that there is no interior solution to the




























Obviously, this can not be a solution, since K1 < 0 and L2 < 0. Therefore let
us consider the boundary solutions. There are eight possible allocations:
1. L1 = 0;K2 2 (0;y),
2. L1 = 0;K2 2 (0;y),
3. L1 = x;K2 = y,
414. L1 = 0;K2 = y,
5. L1 = x;K2 = 0,
6. L1 = 0;K2 = 0,
7. L1 2 (0;x);K2 = y,
8. L1 2 (0;x);K2 = 0.
Allocation 1 and 7, 2 and 8, 4 and 5 are symmetric and therefore I will develop




f() = ((K1 + K2)1  + (L1 + L2)1 )
1
1 ;
s:t: pK1 + L1 = x;
K2 + pL2 = y:
Allocation 6 is: [(K1;L1);(K2;L2)] = [(x
p;0);(0;
y
p)]. The output resulting from
















Obviously, for any p > 1, f6 < f3, so that the Allocation 6 cannot be optimal
solution to the problem (10).
Allocation 1 leads to the following maximization problem:
max
fK1;K2;L1;L2g
f() = A((K1 + K2)1  + (L1 + L2)1 )
1
1 ;
s:t: K1 = 0;L1 = x;
K2 + pL2 = y;
K1;K2;L1;L2  0:
We are interested in interior solution to this problem, because otherwise the
problem is analogical either to Allocation 3 or to Allocation 5. The interior solution
exists if x  yp  1




















Allocation 2, leads to the maximization problem
max
fK1;K2;L1;L2g
f() = ((K1 + K2)1  + (L1 + L2)1 )
1
1 ;
s:t: K1 = x
p;L1 = 0;
K2 + pL2 = y;
K1;K2;L1;L2  0:
The existence of interior solution requires x  yp
1


































Finally, Allocation 4: [(K1;L1);(K2;L2)] = [(x








So, to determine the optimal solution we need to compare the value of func-
tions f1(x;y);f2(x;y);f3(x;y) and f4(x;y). This comparison is relatively straight-
forward and therefore I only sketch it without going into details. There are several
cases to be considered:
1. y  xp
1



































It is less obvious, that f1(x;y) > f3(x;y). To prove this, I will re-write the
inequality in the following form:











x. Notice, that if t = p
1
, then the left-hand side of the above
inequality, which I will call L(t) is equal to the right-hand side, which I will
call R(t), namely L(t) = R(t) = 1 + p
1 
 .
43Since both L(t) and R(t) are increasing functions of t, it is enough to show,
that L0(t) > R0(t) in order to prove that inequality (12) is true. Taking the
respective derivatives, one can see, that
L
0(t) > R


















where the last inequality always holds for
y




  y  xp
1
. If this is the case, then there are three outputs to
be compared: f3(x;y), f4(x;y) and f2(x;y). The analysis in analogical to
previous case and the conclusion is f3(x;y) > f2(x;y) > f4(x;y).
3. y  xp  1
. Using the similar approach, as in (1), it is possible to show, that
f4(x;y) < f3(x;y).
The analysis of the residual allocations 5;7 and 8 is symmetric. Hence, among
all possible allocations, which satisfy the constrains of problem (10) the allocation
which maximize the joint production are:
1. Allocation 1, if x
y  p  1
,









The resulting output therefore is the following:
f(x;y) =
8
> > > > > > <



































Proof of Proposition 3




2 ; c; d
T
P = R(1   T
1   T
2 )(1   e (x1 +y1 )
1



















(RCT1) x  c;




























A(y   d) = 0:
As it was the case with competition, at least one of the constrains (ICT1;RCT1)
and (ICT2;RCT2) will be binding. If the incentive constraint is not binding, then
an agent will invest all available funds, i.e. resource constrain will be binding. On
the other hand, if the recourse constrain is not binding, then equilibrium conditions
imply, that incentive constraint is binding.
The proof is developed in several steps.
Step 1. All constrains for the principal problem are binding. The argument is
analogical to the proof of Proposition 1.
Step 2. With all constrains being binding, we can re-write the problem of the



























Taking the rst-order condition w.r.t x and y and expressing R, I receive the
system of equation R = F1(x;y);R = F2(x;y).26 In the optimal solution therefore,





















26The rst-order conditions are straightforward, but are too cumbersome, and therefore are
not presented here.
45Step 3. Taking into account the results of two previous steps, I can re-write




P = R(1   2T)(1   e 2
1
1  x)   2c (14)













1  c(1 + 2e
2
1


















Step 4. According to (16), c is monotonically increasing in R. Let us determine
the threshold ^ R, such that c > 0 if R > ^ R. Solving Equation (16) for c = 0, I
obtain the value of ^ R = 32

 1. So, for R  32

1  the team will not be employed
and for R > 3  2

1  the team will be employed. In the latter case the prot of
the principal is positive. To see this, I will rst prove, that T
P is increasing in R,



















































, is positive if R > ^ R.
Since T
P( ^ R) = 0, for any R > ^ R, prot of the principal is positive..
Step 5. I have proved that the agents are oered a symmetric contract. If the
incentive constraint is satised, they allocate all fund to R&D. This rules out all
equilibria expect (0;0) and (c;c), where optimal c was derived at step 3.
According to the equilibrium conditions (see Table 2), an equilibrium (0;0) will
be played if RT
1 = RT





















1  () R > 1 + 2
1
1 :
46From the incentive constraint it also follows, that RT










1  i R  1 + 2
1
1 :
Hence, there are two equilibria (c;c) and (0;0), if 3  2

1  < R  1 + 2
1
1 .
Otherwise, there is a single equilibrium (c;c).
Proof of Corollary 2
The proof is completely analogical to the proof of Corollary 1 and will be
therefore abandoned.
Proof of Lemma 1
Recall, that the domain of d and t is such, that d 2 [0;t] and t 2 [d;((c  
d)1  + d1 )
1
1 ]. Let me rst consider the derivative
@H
1
@d =  1   d 1(et  
1)t  + d (t1    d1 )

1 . Agent A1 employing agent A2 implies, that this
derivative is increasing in d = 0, so that the optimal d is positive. Further, for
d = t the derivative
@H
1
@d takes the value
@H
1
@d =  1   
t (et   1) < 0: Hence, d = t
cannot be the optimal solution. Therefore, the optimum should be reached in the




Consider now the derivative
@H
1
@t . I have showed in the Proof of Proposition 1,
that it is optimal for the principal to provide such incentives, that agents invest
all funds in their discretion into the R&D. Hence, the principal will choose such c,
that the optimal choice of x and d satises c = d+x = d+(t1  d1 )
1
1 , which
is equivalent to t = ((c   d)1  + d1 )
1
1 . But, for this t to be an equilibrium
choice of the rst agent, it must be, that
@H
1
















Since t = ((c d)1 +d1 )
1
1  for any 1, which satises the inequality above,




Proof of Proposition 4.











































. Note, that z > 1 since d < t. Then, I can










=  1   z + (z   1)

 1:
If f(z) = 1 + z   (z   1)

 1 is positive for some , then the right-hand
side of inequality (18) is negative, which implies
@H
1
@d < 0. The function f(z)
reaches its minimum in z = 1 + (1   )
1 





2 1. This value is positive, if  <  , where




is strictly negative, so that agent A1 will never employ agent A2.
The second statement of the proposition follows directly from the Lemma 1.




Substituting x = (t1    d1 )








Given t > 0, this condition directly implies x > d.
Solution for the hierarchical team,  = 0:5
Let  = 0:5. Then, the derivatives of H




























t   1)(2t   1)

: (20)
Notice, that In the solution to A1's maximization problem d = 0 if and only if
1   et + 2t  0.
48Suciency:
If 1   et + 2t  0, then
@H
1
@d < 0 for any d 2 [0;t]. Hence, optimal solution is
d = 0.
Necessity:
If d = 0 is the optimal solution, then it must be the case, that
@H
1











Hence, for d = 0,
@H
1
@d !  1, if 1 et+2t  0 and
@H
1
@d ! +1 if 1 et+2t > 0.
Therefore, for d = 0 to be an optimal solution it is necessarily must be, that
1   et + 2t  0.
Let me denote ^ t the solution of the equation 1   et + 2t = 0. Then, inequality
1   et + 2t  0 is equivalent to t  ^ t. It is possible to estimate, that ^ t  1:25643.
Hence, for any t  ^ t, the rst agent will optimally choose d = 0 and will not
employ the second agent. Let us nd out, which value of R1 corresponds to this
threshold value.
According to Lemma 1, for t > ^ t, we can limit our attention to the interior
solution of A1's problem, so that
@H
1
@d = 0 and
@H
1
@t = 0. From these rst-order
conditions it is possible to express R1:
d =















The equations above can be used to nd the value of R1, corresponding to thresh-
old value ^ t: R ^ 1  3:51286. For any R1  R ^ 1 the rst agent will not employ
the second agent. To nd the value of R, which corresponds to the R ^ 1, one need




P = R(1   1)(1   e t)   c
s:t: c = x + d = (t1    d1 )
1
1  + d
d is given by (21)
R1 is given by (22):






t( 2 + t   4t
3 + e
t(6   7t + 4t
2) + e
3t(2   5t + 6t
2)  
 e





Plotting the graph for R(t), where t 2 [0; ^ t] it is possible to verify, that R increases
in t. Using Equation (23), I can now estimate the threshold ^ R = R(^ t). For the
values R > ^ R the rst agent will prefer not to employ agent A2. By plugging the
value of ^ t into the function f(t), it is possible to estimate, that R(^ t)  14:4903.
Hence, if R  14:4903 and  = 0:5, the team with hierarchy is not feasible to
the principal. Continuity implies, that the same conclusion holds for the open set
around  = 0:5.
If R < R(^ t), then Equation (23) can be used to numerically evaluate the prot
of the principal and the parameters of the contract in the situation when the
hierarchical team is employed. The fact, that t = ((c d)1 +d1 )
1
1  and d < c
implies, that t = 0 i c = 0. Hence, we can use Equation (23) to nd R, such that
c(R) = 0. By applying the L'Hospital rule three times in a raw, it is possible to
establish, that as R ! 1:5 as c ! 0. Hence, for R  1:5 the principal will choose
zero level of investments in equilibrium, otherwise he will choose c > 0.
To compare the hierarchical team with the team with equal partners, notice,
that from the Proposition 3 it follows, that the latter will be nanced for R > 1:5.
Hence, we have to compare prot of the principal, investment expenditures and
reward of the agent for two alternative team structures for R 2 (1:5;14:4903).
From the numerical comparison (see Figure 2) it follows, that the principal is
better o by employing the team with equal partners.
Proof of Corollary 3
The proof is done by a mean of example. Consider  = 2
3. Using Lemma 1,
the rst order conditions of the A1's problem are:
d =
27t4























P = R(1   1)(1   e t)   c
s:t: c = x + d = (t1    d1 )
1
1  + d
d is given by (24)
R1 is given by (25):
50The rst order condition results in the following equation:
R =
1







3t(54t   26) +
+e
t( 46 + 59t   9t
2) + 18e





It is tedious, but relatively straightforward to verify, that R increases in t.
As I have shown above (see example for  = 0:5), c = 0 i t = 0. Applying
L'Hospital rule to the Equation (26), one can establish, that R ! 47
64  0:73 as
t ! 0. Since R is increasing in t, the hierarchical team will be allocated the
positive amount of investment, if R > 47
64  0:73. For all R 2 [0:73;0:75], the
team with equal partners will not be nanced (this follows from the Proposition
3). The prot functions H
P and T
P are increasing in R, which implies, that in the
neighborhood of R = 0:75 it must be true, that H
P > T
P. From the numerical
computations it follows, that H
P = T
P if R  0:8952. Hence, the principal will
employ the hierarchical team, if R 2 [0:73;0:8952]. For R > 0:8952 he will prefer
team with equal partners. On Figure 3, I illustrate the prot of the principal
under both alternative team structures for R > 0:8952.
51B Appendix: Tables and Figures









Figure 2: Prot of the principal ( = 1
2;R 2 (1:5;14:4903)): equal-partner team (thick line)
vs. team with hierarchy (thin line).









Figure 3: Prot of the principal ( = 2
3;R  0:8952): equal-partner team (thick line) vs. team
with hierarchy (thin line).














x = c   d
y = d
R
Figure 4: Equilibrium investment level of agents A1 and A2 in team with hierarchy:  = 2
3








Figure 5: Illustration of a case, where the team leader overinvests in the hierarchical team:
 = 2






1  1 RC
2  1
(x;0) RC
































































































Table 2: Equilibrium conditions in team production
54